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Firms, contracts, and financial structure / Oliver Hart

Main Author Hart, Oliver D. Country Reino Unido. Publication Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1995 Description VIII, 228 p. ; 22 cm Series Clarendon lectures in economics ISBN 978-0-19-828881-7 CDU 658
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Item type Current location Call number Status Date due Barcode Item holds Course reserves
Monografia Biblioteca Geral da Universidade do Minho
BGUM 658 - H Available 304176
Monografia Biblioteca Geral da Universidade do Minho
BGUM 658 - H Não requisitável | Not for loan 328803

Mestrado em Economia Industrial e da Empresa Economia da Empresa 2º semestre

Monografia Biblioteca Geral da Universidade do Minho
BGUM 658 - H Available 387971
Total holds: 0

Enhanced descriptions from Syndetics:

This book provides a framework for thinking about economic instiutions such as firms. The basic idea is that institutions arise in situations where people write incomplete contracts and where the allocation of power or control is therefore important. Power and control are not standardconcepts in economic theory. The book begins by pointing out that traditional approaches cannot explain on the one hand why all transactions do not take place in one huge firm and on the other hand why firms matter at all. An incomplete contracting or property rights approach is then developed. Itis argued that this approach can throw light on the boundaries of firms and on the meaning of asset ownership. In the remainder of the book, incomplete contacting ideas are applied to understand firms' financial decisions, in particular, the nature of debt and equity (why equity has votes andcreditors have foreclosure rights); the capital structure decisions of public companies; optimal bankruptcy procedure; and the allocation of voting rights across a company's shares. The book is written in a fairly non-technical style and includes many examples. It is aimed at advanced undergraduateand graduate students, academic and business economists, and lawyers as well as those with an interest in corporate finance, privatization and regulation, and transitional issues in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and China. Little background knowledge is required, since the concepts aredeveloped as the book progresses and the existing literature is fully reviewed.

Table of contents provided by Syndetics

  • Acknowledgements (p. vii)
  • Introduction (p. 1)
  • Part I Understanding Firms (p. 13)
  • 2 The Property Rights Approach (p. 29)
  • 3 Further Issues Arising from the Property Rights Approach (p. 56)
  • 4 A Discussion of the Foundations of the Incomplete Contracting Model (p. 73)
  • Appendix Message-Dependent Ownership Structures (p. 89)
  • Part II Understanding Financial Structure (p. 93)
  • 5 Theories of Financial Contracting and Debt (p. 95)
  • Appendix the: Costly State Verification Approach (p. 121)
  • 6 Capital Structure Decisions of a Public Company (p. 126)
  • Appendix Another Role of Short-Term Debt: Model 3 (p. 152)
  • 7 Bankruptcy Procedure (p. 156)
  • 8 The Structure of Voting Rights in a Public Company (p. 186)
  • References (p. 211)
  • Index (p. 223)

Author notes provided by Syndetics

Oliver Hart has written for the Wall Street Journal and the Financial Times as well as contributing to numerous refereed journals. He is currently a member of the Econometric Society and has taught at Harvard, the LSE, MIT, Exeter and Cambridge Universities among others.

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